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Abstract
This paper analyzes the run up of the financial crisis from monetary policy point of view. After showing 
that the Taylor rule closely conforms to policy interest rate setting practices of the Federal Reserve System 
(Fed) from 1987 onwards, we use the Taylor rule in order to represent the Fed’s interest rate setting policy. 
Utilizing cumulative sum (cusum) and Chow forecast tests we show that starting from the early 2000s the 
Fed started to follow a loose monetary policy. We argue that loose monetary policy and the consequent 
excess liquidity in the markets, accompanied by easy credit policies and deregulation in the financial 
system helped to fledge a housing bubble and hence the 2007-08 global financial crisis. We also discuss 
unconventional monetary policies during the crisis period and the desire of the Fed to return to normal time 
policies as the economic situation improves. 
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PARA POLİTİKASI VE 2007-2008 KÜRESEL FİNANSAL KRİZİ:
GENEL BİR DEĞERLENDİRME
Öz
Bu çalışma küresel finansal krize giden süreçte Amerika Merkez Bankası’nın (Fed) izlediği para 
politikasını incelemiştir. Taylor kanununun Fed’in politika faiz oranlarını belirlemesini başarılı bir şekilde 
açıkladığını gösterdikten sonra Taylor kanununu para politikası analizimiz için kullandık. Krize giden 
süreçte Fed’in politikalarında bir kırılma olup olmadığını ardışık kalıntılar toplamı (cusum) ve Chow 
testleriyle sınadık. Test sonuçları bize 2003 yılından itibaren Fed’in genişleyici bir para politikası takip 
ettiğini gösterdi. Bu çalışmada, genişleyici para politikası ve likidite bolluğuna eşlik eden bankaların kolay 
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kredi verme politikalarının bir konut balonuna ve nihayetinde 2007-08 küresel finansal krizine yol açtığı 
tartışıldı. Son olarak da, kriz boyunca takip edilen geleneksel olmayan para politikalarından ve geleneksel 
para politikalarına dönme eğiliminden bahsedildi. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Para Politikası, Taylor Kanunu, Küresel Finansal Kriz
Jel Kodları: E52, E58, G01
1. Introduction
The global financial crisis that started in the US in 2007-08 and shook up the global 
economic and financial system was actually preceded by a two decades long tranquil period: the 
great moderation. From the early 1980s the US (and to some extent other developed countries) 
experienced a more steady real GDP growth and low and stable inflation. For instance, in order 
to identify this era (Stock and Watson 2003, 6) measure the standard deviation of growth of GDP 
(averaged four quarters), and find out that it is one third less during 1984 to 2002 than it is during 
1960 to 1983.
There are different views about what had generated the great moderation. (Stock and Watson 
2003, 3) suggest that much of the drop in output and inflation volatility was due to smaller 
macroeconomic shocks (such as oil price shocks or productivity shocks) in this period. (Davis and 
Kahn 2008, 1-2) suggest that improved inventory control (supported by technological advances) 
is a major contributor to the decline in US aggregate output volatility. (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 
2000, 148) suggest that better monetary policies during this period resulted in reduced inflation 
and output volatility. In order to underline this point the authors state that lack of macroeconomic 
shocks may also be effective in bringing about stable output growth; but better monetary policy 
making practices is necessary to generate steady low inflation.
As better monetary policies are considered to be a major source of the great moderation, 
deviation from good monetary policy making turns out to be the major factor that ended the great 
moderation as well as the driving force of the 2007-08 global financial crisis. This paper analyzes the 
run up of the financial crisis from monetary policy point of view. Specifically, we argue that starting 
from the early 2000s the Federal Reserve System (Fed) started to follow loose monetary policies and 
provided the markets with superfluous liquidity. The excess liquidity in return damaged the stability 
of the financial markets and called forth the financial crisis. Excess liquidity combined with easy 
credit policies and financial deregulation triggered the 2007-08 financial crisis.
More specifically, accompanied with easy access to home loans, loose monetary policy 
first helped to inflate the housing prices in the US. When the Fed started increasing its policy 
interest rates (due to inflationary pressures) the housing bubble eventually burst. Thence, it was 
realized that improvements in financial products during the past few decades and regulators’ 
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failure to keep pace with financial innovation left the financial system vulnerable to shocks. 
Accordingly, after the burst of the housing bubble many of the world’s largest banks were caught 
with dangerously low capitalization which was far from sufficient to absorb the losses that the 
banks had to undertake. In return, mistrust in the financial markets led to panic and bank runs. 
Even some of the biggest global financial institutions either failed, bought by some other banks 
or taken over by government.
Despite its importance and role in the financial crisis, this paper does not analyze the 
financial regulation (or, deregulation) in depth. We rather intend to reveal the loose monetary 
policy practices in the run up of the crisis. In order to do so, we first show that, in normal times, 
the Taylor rule represents the Fed’s (as well as many other central banks’) interest rate setting 
practices quite well. Afterwards, we show that the Fed diverged from the Taylor rule and moved 
towards a lax monetary policy starting from early 2000s. And we argue that, combined with 
financial deregulation, loose monetary policy followed in this period led to financial crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section starts with monetary policy analysis 
and the Taylor rule. Section 3 empirically shows the divergence from the Taylor rule and the 
emergence of the financial crisis. Section 4 briefly discusses the transmission of lose monetary 
policies to housing bubble and the unconventional monetary policy making during the crisis. The 
last section concludes. 
2. Monetary Policy and the Taylor Rule
During the past few decades there has been a substantial progress in monetary theory and a 
wide consensus on characteristics of good monetary policy making has emerged. For instance, 
there is an agreement on the necessity of central bank (CB) independence for good monetary 
policy performance. Or, for the general course of monetary policy many central banks today 
set price stability as their primary objective and they follow inflation targeting (IT) in order to 
maintain this objective. Maintaining maximum attainable level of employment is the other goal 
that major CBs assume. For instance, the Fed has a dual mandate of maintaining price stability 
and attaining a maximum level of employment. The Bank of England’s (BOE) core objective is 
price stability but the bank stresses that low inflation is not an end itself; according to the BOE it 
is a precondition for achieving sustainable growth and a high level of employment.
On the theoretical side, many CBs have adopted New Keynesian (NK) model as the main 
frame of their medium-scale models. The NK framework incorporates imperfect competition and 
staggered price adjustment into macroeconomic framework where rational agents solve inter-
temporal optimization problems. More specifically, supply side of the NK model is composed 
of monopolistically competitive firms and Calvo type price or wage stickiness. On the demand 
side, Euler equation determines optimal intertemporal consumption allocation and a Taylor 
type interest rate rule determines policy interest rates (Blanchard and Gali, 2007, 35). Hence, 
monetary policy in the NK model is represented by a Taylor rule.
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2.1. The Taylor Rule
In his seminal paper, (Taylor 1993, 202) shows that the Fed interest rate setting policy can be 
described by adjustments in its policy interest rates in response to deviation of inflation from a 
target level and deviation of output from its natural level. This simple rule is actually composed 
of the two targets (or the dual mandate) of the Fed: maximum sustainable economic growth (or 
employment) and price level stability. The corresponding simple monetary policy specification 
reads:
         (1)
where,  is the policy interest rate;  is the neutral real interest rate;  is the inflation rate;  is the 
deviation of inflation from its target level;  is deviation of output from its natural level; and  is 
stochastic error term. (Taylor, 1993, 202) assumes that the neutral real rate to be 2%;1 uses CPI as 
inflation measure and takes the average CPI over the past four quarters in order to get a smoothed 
inflation measure. Target inflation rate is assumed to be 2%; this is also the official inflation target 
that the Fed set in 2012. 
In the underlying loss function, the Fed minimizes the deviation of inflation from its target 
level and deviation of output from its natural level as in the following form:
         (2) 
where  is the target level of inflation and  is the natural level of output.2 
(Taylor, 1993, 202) tests the above simple interest rate rule with coefficients  and  for the 
1987-1992 period and shows that this rule closely corresponds to the Fed’s policy interest rates. 
We have re-calculated the Taylor rule with coefficients as in (Taylor, 1993, 202) for the period 
1987-2007. Figure 1 below is a generic comparison of the Taylor rule with the Fed rates in this 
period.
1 Average real interest rate over an appropriate period is considered to be a good proxy for the neutral real 
interest rate.
2 (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999, 73) show that such a loss function may be obtained by quadratic 
approximation of a utility based welfare function, where households derive disutility from deviations from 
the efficient allocation. Nevertheless, as (Woodford, 2003, 618) puts forward, despite the fact that Taylor rule 
has some characteristics of reaction function associated with optimal policies and in spite of its usefulness, 
Taylor type of rules are not substitutes for fully-fledged economic models.
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Figure 1. The Taylor Rule and the Fed Rates, Quarterly US Data
Data Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Bureau of Labor Statistics. Authors own calculation.
The success of the Taylor rule in matching the Fed’s policy interest rates, its strength as a 
feedback rule in improving decision making process of policy makers, and its ease of use endowed 
the Taylor rule to emerge as a common characterization of the Fed’s and many other major central 
banks’ interest rate setting behavior. Consequently, many scholars utilized the Taylor rule in their 
monetary policy analysis. For instance, using a Taylor type of rule, (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 
2000, 155-156) study the conduct of monetary policy under different Fed chairs and the authors 
find substantial differences between pre and post 1979 periods. Specifically, the authors show 
that prior to 1979, in response to increases in expected inflation the Fed increased its (nominal) 
policy interest rates by less than the increases in expected inflation; in other words, the monetary 
policy was accommodative during this period. In the post-1979 period, the authors show, the 
Fed increased its nominal as well as real policy interest rates in response to increases in expected 
inflation; hence, the monetary policy was anti-inflationary and stabilizing in this period.
In (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998, 1042-1061) the authors again utilize a Taylor type rule to 
provide an insight for interest rate setting behaviors of G3 (Germany, Japan, US) and E3 (the UK, 
France and Italy) countries. The authors study the G3 countries in the post-1979 era in order to 
identify the features of effective monetary policy making; and they analyze the E3 countries in 
order to identify the problems of monetary policy making during the European Monetary System 
(EMS) era, which collapsed in late 1992. 
(Adam, Cobham and Girardin, 2005, 497-516) estimate reaction function of Bank of England 
(BOE) based on augmented Taylor rule in three sub periods: pre-European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) (1985-1990), post-ERM (after 1992) and the period when BOE was given 
operational independence (in 1997). Results of the study suggest that institutional arrangements 
are decisive on policy reaction functions; BOE started to follow reaction functions similar to 
other developed countries’ central banks (like those of G3) only after it gained operational 
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independence. Likewise, (Nelson, 2000, 7-29) and (Taylor and Davradakis, 2006, 2-11) also apply 
the Taylor rule to study the UK monetary policy. (Demers and Rodrigues, 2002, 1-13) study the 
Canadian interest rate setting behavior within a Taylor rule framework.
Despite the success of the Taylor rule in predicting the Fed’s (and other CBs’) policy interest 
rates, empirical studies show that CBs’ tend to move their interest rates gradually. However, 
(Rudebusch, 2002, 1161-1187) and (Rudebusch and Wu, 2008, 906-926) show that interest rate 
changes cannot be predicted in the financial markets; the authors accordingly conclude that there 
is no deliberate interest rate smoothing. Following this argument, we do not utilize an interest 
rate smoothing term in our analysis and employ a Taylor rule in its original form.
3. Empirical Analysis 
A crucial point to be observed in Figure 1 above is that the Fed’s policy interest rates 
persistently remained below what the Taylor rule suggests during the few years prior to 2007. 
More specifically, if one takes the interest rates implied by the Taylor rule as a basis, from around 
2002 onwards the Fed maintained a loose monetary policy. In order to test the validity of this 
argument we first run an OLS regression and identify the Taylor rule coefficients. Afterwards we 
investigate whether if there was a structural break in the Fed policies prior to crisis.
The Taylor rule we utilize is a standard one as in equation (1) above. Specifically:
                  (3) 
The intercept coefficient, , by nature is composed of neutral interest rate and inflation rate. 
This is actually the fictive Fed rate when output gap is zero and inflation is at its 2% target rate.
Data
There has been some controversy on whether to use past data or forecast variables in Taylor 
rule analysis. (Taylor, 1993, 202) uses lagged values of inflation for his analysis and states that lagged 
inflation rate serves as a proxy for expected inflation. (Taylor, 2009, 345) shows that, regarding 
the impacts of policy rules there is not much difference between using inflation forecasts and 
using past variables. Similarly, (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000, 151) consider forward looking 
specifications to be more plausible in their monetary policy analysis, but the authors show that 
their key results hold also with backward looking specifications. Moreover, (Woodford, 2003, 
617) shows that both contemporaneous and lagged variables could be used to specify an optimal 
rule. The author argues that as long as the Taylor rule is interpreted as a feedback rule to achieve 
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a desirable path for target variables it may be considered in the set of optimal policy analysis. 
Following these arguments, we adopt original Taylor rule specification and use contemporaneous 
and lagged data (rather than expectations) in our analysis.
In order to conform to the literature, in particular to the original work of (Taylor, 1993, 202), 
we use quarterly data and our data starts from 1987. Because crisis periods are not suitable for 
long term monetary policy analysis and because unconventional monetary policies came into 
effect in 2008, December 2007 marks the end date of our analysis.
The Fed states that while setting its policy interest rates the monetary policy committee 
considers inflation over some periods (ranging from a few months to a year). This is because, the 
Fed argues, inflation level can widely vary from month to month. Following the Fed’s practice 
and (Taylor, 1993, 202) we use smoothed values of inflation over the past four quarters to set the 
deviation of inflation from its target level. Quarterly CPI data is extracted from US Department 
of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We derived output gap using Industrial Production Index (IPI) by HP-filtering method. Both 
the IPI data and Federal Funds Target Rate is extracted from Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. All the results are produced by E-views.
Results
The OLS output for equation (3) for the period 1987-2007 is as follows; the standard error of 
each regression coefficient is given in parenthesis.3
          (4)
The coefficient estimates are all significant and correctly signed. Being greater than one, the 
inflation coefficient also satisfies the “Taylor principle” which states that for rational expectations 
model of this type of model to be stable, interest rate increases should be greater than the rise in 
inflation. The OLS output is in accordance with our expectations as well as with the Fed rates as 
depicted in Figure 2 below. 
3 Stationarity of Fed rates, outputgap and inflation are tested with Ng-Perron (both with ‘trend’ and ‘trend and 
intercept’ options). Presence of unit root is rejected at 5% significance level in all the cases.
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Figure 2. (OLS) Estimated Taylor Rule and the Fed Rates, Quarterly US Data
Data Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and U.S Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Authors own calculation.
We now turn to analyze whether if there was a structural break in the Fed policies before the 
crisis. That is, we would like to see if the Fed started to follow a loose monetary policy in the run 
up of the crisis. Initially, we would like to see if there is any indication of structural break in the 
implied monetary policy making of the Fed.  (Brown, Durbin and Evans, 1975, 153) propose to 
calculate cumulative sum (CUSUM) of the recursive forecast errors in order to identify gradual 
changes in a model. Formally,
where, n is the date of the first forecast error, T is the last observation in the data set, and  is 
the standard deviation of the forecast errors.
If CUSUM is statistically different from zero the procedure implies a structural break in the 
model. The CUSUM analysis of our model, with 5% significance level is given below. Figure 3 
indicates that starting from 2001 there is a gradual change in our model.4
Figure 3. CUSUM Analysis for Parameter Stability.
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4 An event like breakdown of the Bretton Woods System or the Exchange Rate Mechanism would indicate a 
discrete (rather than gradual) change.
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The CUSUM analysis provides a good reason to suspect a structural break in our model. To 
be more concrete, we now run a Chow forecast test in order to see if our model is sufficiently 
different during 1987-2002 and during 2003-2007 periods. The null hypothesis of the Chow 
forecast tests is that there is no structural change in the equation over the sample period. The test 
results are given below.
Table 1. Chow Forecast Test Results
Chow Forecast Test
Equation: TAYLOR
Specification: FEDRATES=C(1)+C(2)*OUTPUTGAP+C(3)*(AVGCPI-2)
Test predictions for observations from 2003Q1 to 2007Q4
Value df Probability
F-statistic  2.040887 (20, 61)  0.0174
Likelihood ratio  43.03407  20  0.0020
Both the F-statistics and the likelihood ratio statistics reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no structural change in the interest rate setting function before and after 2003. Hence, at 5% 
significance level both the CUSUM test and the Chow forecast tests indicates a structural break 
in the Taylor rule indicated Fed policies around 2003. 
As the two tests that we have run above indicate a structural break around 2003, we generated 
dummy variables with zeros for the period 1987 to 2003 and ones from 2003 onwards and re-run 
the OLS regression. The coefficients of the Taylor rule with dummy variables are given below; the 
standard error of each regression coefficient is given in parenthesis.
 
                  
 (5)
 
The regression results indicate that the Fed rates from 2003 to 2007 were 1.44 points lower 
compared to the period 1987-2003. Hence, our findings are in accordance with the arguments 
that the Fed was following extra loose monetary policy prior to crisis which eventually turned out 
to be a major source of the financial crisis.
Nevertheless, the Fed’s chairman at the time, Ben Bernanke objects to these criticism. 
(Bernanke, 2010, 8) argues that, the Fed uses inflation forecasts (rather than the past inflation 
rates used in the standard Taylor rule) and their feedback rule is in line with their inflation 
expectations. It is also argued that the Fed kept its policy interest rates at low levels in order 
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to mitigate the effects of the dot-com bubble that burst in early 2000s. Or, Fed’s aversion for 
deflation (witnessing decades long Japanese trouble) might also have played a role in its low 
interest rate policies. Some scholars also argue that it was rather the “savings glut” in Asia that 
kept global interest rates low. But in any case, the Fed’s expected inflation rate turns out to be too 
low in order to maintain a stable monetary policy. 
4. Loose Monetary Policy and the Crisis: The Transmission Mechanism
Prolonged loose monetary policy often jeopardizes financial stability. Regarding the 2007-
2008 financial crisis, (Taylor, 2009, 342) argues that monetary excesses were the main cause of 
the housing boom; and the bust of the housing market was the driving force of the financial 
turmoil. As we have showed above, the Fed indeed followed extraordinary loose monetary policy 
in the run up of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Low policy interest rates, together with easy credit 
policies, induced a housing bubble. Specifically, starting from early 2000s easy credit policies and 
loose monetary policy made mortgages attractive to many households and fostered demand for 
housing. The figure below depicts the extraordinary escalation in the house prices starting from 
early 2003, and the peak around 2006. Note that the rise in house prices coincides with the extra 
expansionary monetary policy period indicated above.
Figure 4. Median Sales Prices for New Houses Sold in the United States.
 
Source: Data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Studying the role of housing market and monetary policy in the US business cycles (Jarocinski 
and Smets, 2008, 16) find that easy monetary policy had contributed to the housing market boom 
in 2004 and 2005. (Ahrend, Cournede and Price, 2008, 5) also find that periods in which short 
term interest rates remain below what the Taylor rule suggests are generally correlated with 
imbalances in housing markets.
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Regarding the effect of monetary policy on easy credit policies, (Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro 
and Saurina, 2014, 463-505) find that lower policy interest rates induce banks to expand credit 
to riskier agents. Indeed, as interest rates remained low, banks extended mortgage credits to 
households with poor credit histories (or “subprime” borrowers). As house prices started to 
plunge in late 2006, subprime mortgage borrowers started to default and financial institutions 
that held subprime mortgages started announcing losses. The subsequent spread and deepening 
of the crisis was further engineered in the shadow banking system (i.e., financial institutions 
like investment banking and the hedge funds), where financial deregulation was more apparent. 
These financial institutions took over some mortgage loans, pooled them and created mortgage 
backed securities (MBS) and sold them in the global financial market. MBS’ were imagined 
to be low-risk securities. However, as the housing market in the US crashed on a nationwide 
basis, it was realized that MBS’ were no safer than the subprime mortgages. Accordingly, even 
determining the worth of MBS’ became a challenge and financial institutions’ balance sheets 
and their stance were under suspicion. In sum, loose monetary policy, easy credit policies and 
financial deregulation generated financial instability and new financial instruments helped to 
spread the crisis to a global basis. 
4.1. Unconventional Monetary Policy during the Crisis
When the U.S government seized two government sponsored agencies that provide funding 
for new home mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the instability in the financial sector 
was deepened. Panic in the world financial system started when Lehman Brothers collapsed in 
September 2008. Takeover of Bank of America by Meryl Lynch and bailout package in order to 
rescue AIG were the aftershocks to the global financial system and to the world economy.  
Following the crisis in the financial sector, the US economy started sliding into a deep 
recession. Fed’s first reaction was cutting the policy interest rates up to the zero lower bound. 
But in order to prevent a recession like the one in 1930s the Fed still had to provide stimulus to 
the economy. Hence, unconventional monetary policies came into effect. Extra ordinary forward 
guidance and quantitative easing (QE) turned out to be the two major policies that the Fed, as 
well as some other central banks, has been following since then. Forward guidance is explicit 
and stronger policy communication with the public. During the crisis central bankers promised 
to keep interest rates at low levels for extended period of time in order to influence people’s 
expectations of future interest rates and economic activities.
QE is large scale (mostly long-term) asset purchase program with newly printed money. 
The Fed’s asset purchases mostly composed of mortgage backed securities and Treasury bills. As 
QE increases the demand for assets, long term interest rates decrease and in return, economic 
recovery is supported thru monetary policy. The following figure exhibits the dramatic increase 
in the Fed’s total assets following the financial crisis. Prior to crisis, Fed’s total assets were less than 
1 trillion dollar; by 2014 total value of assets exceeded 4 trillion dollars.
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Figure 5. Total Assets of the Federal Reserve System.
Source: Data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
There have been 3 rounds of QE in the US, each with different targets in economic recovery. 
QE1 mainly targeted the banking sector. The banking sector turned out to be highly fragile in 
the aftermath of the crisis; the sector was impeding economic recovery because banks were not 
willing to provide credit to the economic agents. Starting from November 2008, for 17 months 
the Fed purchased $1.7 trillion worth of securities, which 1.25 trillion of it was mortgage backed 
securities. In return, the Fed cleared banks’ balance sheets from their toxic subprime securities 
and helped the banking sector to recover.
QE2 started in November 2010 and for 7 months the Fed purchased $85 billion of Treasury 
bills each month to support the economic activity. In September 2011 the Fed revised QE2 thru 
a program called “operation twist”. According to this program the Fed used its proceedings from 
matured short-term Treasury bills to buy long term Treasury bills. The program also included 
matured short term mortgage backed securities to buy longer term mortgage backed securities. 
The purpose of this program was to support the housing market.
Finally, the Fed announced QE3 in September 2012. With QE3 the Fed promised to purchase 
$85 billion of assets each month, which also included operation twist. In addition to asset 
purchases, the Fed announced that it would keep Fed fund rates at zero until 2015 and would 
continue to buy bonds until the job market improves “substantially”. This promise also clarifies 
the target of QE3: to boost economic activity. These announcements were also part of the forward 
guidance; intending to influence long-term interest rates by informing the public about the future 
course of monetary policy.
The Fed was not the only central bank that used quantitative easing but together with the 
Bank of England (BOE), it was the boldest one in this respect. European Central Bank (ECB) also 
made some form of asset purchases in order to overcome the financial crisis. However, as shown 
in Figure 6 below, compared to the Fed and the BOE, the ECB was rather slow or hesitant to 
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expand its balance sheet. Europe’s recovery from recession was also slow compared to the US and 
the UK. Specifically, while the US’s and the UK’s growth rates are 5.9 and 6.2, respectively, in the 
second quarter of 2014; Eurozone economy could grow only 0.7% in the same period. Likewise, 
while the unemployment rate in the US and the UK is around 6%; it is 11.5% in the Euro area. 
Some scholars witness the strong and faster recovery of the US and the UK from the crisis as the 
success of bolder monetary policies (in particular the QE).5
Figure 6. Total Assets of the Federal Reserve, Bank of England and European Central Bank.
Source: Data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
4.2. Exit from Unconventional Monetary Policies
In order to specify its exit plan from the QE, the FED announced in December 2012 that 
it would continue with its $85 billion worth of monthly asset purchases until either the core 
inflation rises above 2.5% or unemployment falls below 6.5%.6 Such clear targets improved public 
communication of monetary policy. And in December 2013, the Fed announced that it would 
reduce its asset purchases by $10 billion monthly. The Fed kept on reducing its asset purchases 
gradually and finally in October 2014 the Fed announced that it has ended its asset purchases 
program.
(Gertler and Karadi, 2011, 6-50) develop and a DSGE model in order to analyze unconventional 
monetary policy in the manner that the Fed had followed during the financial crisis. The authors 
show that central bank intermediation is effective especially when the zero lower bound starts to 
bind. Nevertheless, taking the “politicization of credit allocation” into account, the authors argue 
5 In addition to monetary policies, the US Treasury also applied some expansionary fiscal policies in order to 
stimulate demand; but they were limited in scope and in effect.
6 Later on, the Fed announced that even after these thresholds are reached they would not be considered as 
automatic triggers.
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that unconventional monetary policies should be reserved for crisis times only. (Bean, Paustian, 
Penalver and Taylor, 2010, 1-27) argue that if applied in normal times, policies such as the QE 
would distort the market structure. Accordingly, the authors suggest that, CBs should return to 
short term policy interest rate management as their aggregate demand management tool.
Hence, despite the fact that unconventional monetary policies during the crisis helped to 
mitigate the effects of the crisis, the research suggest that these policies are not well-suited for 
normal time policy making. Fed’s exit from the asset purchasing program and its announcement 
that it will start increasing its policy interest rates after unemployment level falls to 6.5% or 
annual inflation rate rises to 2.5% implies the Fed’s desire to end crisis time policies and again let 
the main economic indicators to determine the structure of monetary policy. 
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that good monetary policy making practices played a key role 
in achieving an era of low and stable inflation and steady output growth levels, so called the 
great moderation. We have also argued that deviation from the fundamentals of good monetary 
policies and following expansionary policies for extended period of time brought an end to the 
great moderation era and contributed to the emergence of the 2007-08 global financial crisis. 
For monetary policy analysis we have employed the Taylor rule due to its efficiency as a 
feedback rule and due to its practicality in policy analysis. Using a simple OLS regression we 
first showed that the Taylor rule represents the Fed’s interest rate setting behavior quite well. 
Afterwards, in order to detect the structural break in Fed’s policies prior to crisis we performed 
CUSUM and Chow forecast tests. These tests confirmed our suspicion about the gradual break 
in the Fed policies; and the policy interest rates lower than the ones indicated by the Taylor rule 
confirmed the loose monetary policies starting from the early 2000s.
The period of lax monetary policy and excessive liquidity led to housing bubble, whose burst 
marked beginning of the financial crisis. After the burst of the housing bubble, it was realized that 
the financial system was weaker than it was imagined due to deregulations in the system during 
the past few decades.
Regarding the Fed’s reaction to the global financial crisis we have argued that the Fed first 
responded to the crisis by decreasing its policy interest rates. But as the zero lower bound started 
to bite the economy was still sliding into deeper recession due to weak financial system. In return, 
the Fed started to carry out unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative easing and 
forward guidance. Other major central banks, such as the BOE, BOJ, and ECB also followed 
similar unconventional monetary policies. It is usually agreed upon that these policies prevented 
a complete financial collapse and helped the global economy to recover from the crisis.
Despite their usefulness during the crisis times, studies show that unconventional policies 
should be reserved only for extraordinary times. We observe that the Fed is also adjusting its 
policies in this direction. In May 2013 the Fed declared that it would decrease its monthly asset 
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purchases as the economic conditions improve. As a next step, the Fed announced, it would start 
increasing its policy interest rates from around its zero level as unemployment and inflation levels 
reach to certain levels. Indeed, quitting the QE and letting inflation and unemployment levels 
determine its policy interest rates means turning back to its normal time policies.
Getting back on the pre-crisis policy practices should be no surprise as both the basics of 
good monetary policy making and consequences of deviation from these policies have been 
apprehended. As the great moderation era taught the basics of good monetary policy making; the 
global financial crisis have taught the dangers of deviation from those policies. 
Mete Han YAĞMUR
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